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ABSTRACT
Mobile fitness tracking apps allow users to track their workouts and share them with
friends through online social networks. Although the sharing of personal data is an
inherent risk in all social networks, the dangers presented by sharing personal workouts
comprised of geospatial and health data may prove especially grave. While fitness apps
offer a variety of privacy features, at present it is unclear if these countermeasures are
sufficient to thwart a determined attacker, nor is it clear how many of their users are at
risk.
In this work, we perform a systematic analysis of privacy behaviors and threats in
fitness tracking social networks. Collecting a month-long snapshot of public posts to the
popular Strava fitness tracking service (21 million posts, 3 million users), we observe that
16.5% of users make use of Endpoint Privacy Zones (EPZs), which conceal fitness activity
nearby user-designated sensitive locations (e.g., home, office). We go on to develop an
attack against EPZs that infers users’ protected locations from the remaining available
information in public posts, discovering that 95.1% of moderately active users are at risk
of having their protected locations extracted by an attacker. Finally, we consider the
efficacy of state-of-the-art privacy mechanisms through adapting geo-indistinguishability
techniques as well as developing a novel EPZ fuzzing technique. Strava has been notified
of the discovered vulnerabilities and (at time of submission) is preparing to incorporate
our countermeasures into their production system.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Fitness tracking applications such as Strava [1] and MapMyRide [2] are growing increas-
ingly popular, providing users with a means of recording the routes of their cycling, run-
ning, and other activities via GPS-based tracking which is also know as self-tracking [3].
These apps sync to a social network that provides users with the ability to track their
progress and share their fitness activities with other users. The ability to share fitness
activities is an essential ingredient to the success of these services, motivating users to
better themselves through shared accountability with friends and even compete with one
another via leaderboards that are maintained for popular routes.
Although the sharing of personal data is an inherent risk in all social networks [4, 5, 6,
7, 8], there are unique risks associated with the data collected by fitness apps, where users
share geospatial and temporal information about their daily routines, health data, and
lists of valuable exercise equipment. While these services have frequently been credited
as a source of information for bicycle thieves [9, 10], the true risk of sharing this data
came to light in January 2018 when Strava’s global heat map was observed to reveal the
precise locations of classified military bases, CIA rendition sites, and intelligence agencies
[11]. Fitness activity is thus not only a consideration for personal privacy, but in fact is
“data that most intelligence agencies would literally kill to acquire” [12].
In response to public criticism over the global heat map incident, Strava’s CEO, James
Quarles, pointed to the availability of a variety of privacy protection mechanisms as a
means for users to safeguard their accounts [13] – in addition to generic privacy settings,
domain-specific mechanisms such as Endpoint Privacy Zones (EPZs) conceal fitness ac-
tivity that occurs within a certain distance of sensitive user locations such as homes or
work places [14, 15, 16]. However, at present it is unclear if such features are widely
used among athletes, nor is it clear that these countermeasures are adequate to prevent
attackers from discovering the private locations of users.
In this work, we perform a systematic analysis of privacy threats in fitness tracking
social networks. We begin by surveying the fitness app market to identify classes of
privacy mechanisms. Using these insights, we then formalize an attack against the End-
point Privacy Zones feature, which represents the state-of-the-practice for fitness apps.
To characterize the privacy habits of users, we collect a month-long activity dataset of
public posts from Strava, an exemplar fitness tracking service. We next use this dataset
to evaluate our EPZ attack, discovering that 95.1% of regular Strava users are at risk of
having their homes and other sensitive locations exposed. We demonstrate the generality
of this finding by replicating our attack against data collected from two other popular
fitness apps, Garmin Connect and Map My Tracks.
These findings expose the current privacy risks in the state-of-the-practice for fitness
apps, but do not speak to the state-of-the-art of location privacy research. In a final
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(a) Without Privacy Zone
(b) With Privacy Zone
Figure 1.1: Summary of a running activity that occurred in Austin, Texas during the week
of USENIX Security 2016. Figure 1.1a displays the full exercise route of the athlete. Figure
1.1b shows the activity after a privacy zone was retroactively added, obscuring the parts of
the route that occurred within 1/8 of a mile of the Hyatt Regency Austin hotel.
series of experiments, we leverage our Strava dataset to test the effectiveness of privacy
enhancements that have been proposed in the literature [17, 18]. We first evaluate the
EPZ radius obfuscation proposed by [17]. Next, we adapt spatial cloaking techniques
[19] for use in fitness tracking services in order to provide geo-indistinguishability [18] for
protected locations within the radius of the EPZ. Lastly, using insights from our attack
formalization we develop a new privacy enhancement that randomizes the boundary of
the EPZ in order to conceal protected locations. While user privacy can be marginally
improved through deploying these techniques, our results point to an intrinsic tension
that exists within applications seeking to share route information and simultaneously
conceal sensitive end points.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• Demonstrate Privacy Leakage in Fitness Apps
We formalize and demonstrate a practical attack on the EPZ privacy protection mech-
anism. We test our attack against real-world EPZ-enabled activities to determine that
84% of all users are unwittingly revealing their sensitive locations through public fit-
ness posts. When considering only moderate and highly active users, this rate rises to
95.1%.
• Characterize Privacy Behaviors of Fitness App Users
We collect and analyze 21 million activities representing a month of Strava usage. We
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characterize demographic information for users and identify a significant demand for
privacy protections by (16.5%), motivating the need for further study in this area.
• Develop Privacy Extensions
Leveraging our dataset of public activity posts, we evaluate the effectiveness of state-of-
the-art privacy enhancements (e.g., geo-indistinguishability [18]) for solving problems
in fitness tracking networks, and develop novel protections based on insights gained
from this study.
• Vulnerability Disclosure
We have disclosed these results to the affected fitness tracking services. Strava has
acknowledged the vulnerabilities and is currently working to implement our proposed
countermeasure of performing EPZ spatial cloaking.1
Roadmap
We present relevant background information such as the state of the art practices cur-
rently in use by major Fitness Tracking Applications in the next section. In Section 3
we present an attack methodology for identifying and breaking down Endpoint Privacy
Zones (the strongest privacy mechanism which is currently employed). Section 4 con-
cerns our data collection methodology, which is subsequently utilized in Section 5 for
our evaluation. Sections 6 and 7 discuss our countermeasures and mitigations against
our proposed attacks. We introduce a new defense mechanism which augments Endpoint
Privacy Zones with heatmap information in Section 8. Related work is presented in Sec-
tion 9. We close by discussing some ethical considerations in Section 10 and conclude in
Section 11.
1A summary of the disclosure process as well a statement on the ethical considerations of this work
can be found in Section 9.
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CHAPTER 2: FITNESS TRACKING SOCIAL NETWORKS
Popularized by services such as Strava [1], fitness tracking services provide users the
ability to track their outdoor fitness activities (e.g., running) and share those activities
with friends as well as other users around the world. Leveraging common sensors in
mobile devices, these services track users’ movements alongside other metrics, such as the
altitude of the terrain they are traversing. After completing a fitness activity, users receive
a detailed breakdown of their activities featuring statistics such as distance traveled. If
the user pairs a fitness monitor (e.g., Fitbit [20]) to the service, the activity can also
be associated with additional health metrics including heart rate. Beyond publishing
activities to user profiles, fitness tracking services also offer the ability for users to create
and share recommended routes (segments). Each segment is associated with a leaderboard
that records the speed with which each user completed it. Most of these fitness tracking
services contain a social network platform through which users can follow each other
[1, 21, 22]. Followers are granted additional access to user information that may not be
publicly available, such as the list of equipment that the user owns.
As is evident from the features described above, fitness social networks necessarily share
a variety of highly sensitive user information, including spatial and temporal whereabouts,
health data, and a list of valuable equipment that is likely to be found in those locations.
Recognizing the sensitivity of this information, these services offer a variety of privacy
mechanisms to protect their users. We conducted a survey of privacy mechanisms across 8
popular fitness networks, and present a taxonomy of these features in Table 2.1 . Popular
mechanisms include:
F1 Private Profiles/Activities: As is common across many social networks, users have
the ability to make their posts or profiles private. Depending on the service, users can
elect to make all activities private or do so on a case-by-case basis. However, hidden
activities are not counted towards challenges or segment leaderboards, incentivizing
users to make their activities public. Notably, we were unable to find a service for
which this feature was enabled by default.
F2 Block Users: Like other social networks, users have the ability to block other users,
removing them from their follower’s list, and preventing them from viewing their ac-
tivities or contacting them. However, as posts are public by default in these services,
the ability to block a user offers limited utility.
F3 Endpoint Privacy Zone: Since users will often start their activities at sensitive
locations, several services allow users the option to obfuscate routes within a certain
distance of a specified location. In this paper, we refer to this general mechanism as










































Strava [1] 10M 3 3 3 3 [201,1005], 201
Garmin [22] 10M 3 3 7 3 [100,1000], 100
Runtastic [23] 10M 3 7 3 7 -
RunKeeper [24] 10M 3 3 7 7 -
Endomondo [25] 10M 7 3 7 7 -
MapMyRun [2] 5M 3 3 7 7 -
Nike+ [26] 5M 3 3 7 7 -
MapMyTracks [21] 1M 7 3 7 3 [500,1500], 500
Table 2.1: Summary of user privacy features offered across different popular fitness tracking
services. # D/Ls: Number of Downloads in Millions on Android Play Store. EPZ radius size
is in meters.
the service will hide the portion of the user’s route within the EPZ region from being
viewed by other users. We provide a formal definition of an EPZ in 2. An example is
shown in Figure 1.1 1 – after enabling an EPZ, the full route (1.1a) is truncated such
that segments of the route are not visible within a certain radius of a sensitive location
(1.1b). 2
F4 EPZ Radius Size: All three services (Strava, Garmin Connect, Map My Tracks) that
provide an EPZ feature, allow users the option of selecting a circular obfuscation region
from a fixed set of radius size values. Different services provide different minimum and
maximum radius sizes with fixed increments to increase and decrease the size of EPZ
radius. For example, Garmin Connect allows users to select a minimum and a maximum
radius of 100 and 1000 meters with 100 meters increments.
1These images are being used with the permission of the athlete and do not leak any personally
identifiable information as the pictured activity took place on site at a conference.
2Unfortunately, there are also disincentives to leveraging the privacy zones. For example, Strava and
Garmin Connect users will not appear on leaderboards for routes that are affected by their privacy zone.
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CHAPTER 3: YOU CAN RUN, BUT CAN YOU HIDE?
In this section, we set out to determine whether or not fitness tracking services’ users’
trust in the EPZ mechanism is misplaced. To do so, we present an efficient attack
methodology for identifying EPZs. As discussed in 2, EPZs place a hidden circle around
the user’s private location in order to prevent route data within a given radius of that
location from appearing on activity webpages. The hidden part of the route is only visible
to the owner of the activity. Moreover, the number of allowed EPZ radius sizes are fixed
based on the fitness tracking service. For example, Strava provides a fixed set of EPZ
radii of 1/8, 1/4, 3/8, 1/2 or 5/8 of a mile.
It may be intuitive to the reader that, given a finite set of possible circle radii and
a handful of points that intersect the circle, the center of the circle (i.e., a user’s pro-
tected location) is at risk of being inferred. Figure 3.1 demonstrates this intuition for
EPZs. When only one route intersection point is known, there is a large space of possible
EPZ locations; however, given two intersection points, the number of possible EPZs is
dramatically reduced, with the only remaining uncertainty being the radius of the circle
(Figure 3.1a). Given three distinct intersection points (Figure 3.1b), it should be possible
to reliably recover the EPZ radius and center.
In spite of this intuition, it is not necessarily the case that EPZs are ineffective in
practice; a variety of factors may frustrate the act of EPZ identification. First, services
that offer EPZ mechanisms do not indicate to users when an EPZ is active on a route.
Instead, as shown in Figure 1.1, the route is redrawn as if the activity started and finished
outside of the invisible EPZ. Even if an activity is known to intersect an EPZ, it is not
obvious which side of the route (beginning or end) the EPZ intersects. Activity endpoints
that intersect an EPZ are therefore indistinguishable from endpoints that do not, creating
significant noise and uncertainty when attempting to infer a protected location. Moreover,
the GPS sampling fidelity provided by fitness tracking devices and services may be such
that the exact point where a route intersects an EPZ may be irrecoverable. Alternately,
it may also be that EPZs are recoverable in only highly favorable conditions, making the
identification of fitness tracking service users at scale impractical.
3.1 THREAT MODEL
We consider an adversary that wishes to surreptitiously identify the protected home or
work locations of a target user on a fitness tracking service. Through the use of a dummy
account, the adversary learns how the fitness tracking service protects private locations,
as described in 2. However, the attacker is unaware of the target user’s protected location,
and moreover is uncertain if the target has even registered a protected location. To avoid
6
x
(a) With fewer activities, there are multiple
possible EPZs.
x
(b) As the number of activities increase,
possible EPZs are reduced.
Figure 3.1: Simplified activity examples that demonstrate the intuition behind our EPZ
identification approach. Red lines represent activity routes, while circles represent possible
EPZs. In 3.1a, given the available routes there are multiple possible EPZs of different radii,
only one of which is correct. 3.1b shows that an additional activity reduces the space of
possible EPZs to one.
arousing suspicion, the attacker may surveil the target user in any number of ways – by
following the user’s profile from their own account, or querying the target user’s data via
a service API. Regardless of the means, the singular goal of the adversary is to determine
the existence of an EPZ and recover the protected address using only fitness activities
posted to the users’ account.
3.2 SEARCHING ENDPOINT PRIVACY ZONES
3.2.1 Problem Formulation
We formulate our problem as the EPZ Circle Search Problem in the Cartesian plane.
We convert GPS coordinates of the activities to Earth-Centered Earth-Fixed (ECEF)
coordinates in the Cartesian plane. The details of conversion can be found in [27]. This
is justified by the fact that both services and protocols such as GPS cannot provide
arbitrary accuracy. Moreover, this makes the attack algorithm calculations easier without
loss of important information. We first proceed to give a formal definition of EPZ and
use this definition for remainder of section.
Definition 3.1. Endpoint Privacy Zone. Let point ps = (xs, ys) be a sensitive
location in the Cartesian plane, and a be an activity route of n points < p1, . . . , pn >.
EPZps,r is a circle with center ps and radius r that is applied to activity a if p1 or pn are
within distance r of ps. If this is the case, all points pi in a that are within distance r of
ps are removed from a.
With this in mind, the definition of the EPZ Circle Search Problem is as follows:
Definition 3.2. EPZ Circle Search Problem. Let EPZps,r be an active EPZ
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where r is in the set RS provided by service S, and let Au be the set of activity routes
for user u of the form < p1, . . . , pn >. In the EPZ search problem, the goal is to guess
(pg, rg ∈ RS) such that EPZpg ,rg best fits endpoints p1 and pn for all activities in Au.
In order to identify a suitable algorithm for EPZ search problem, we first looked into
circle fit algorithms. Circle fit algorithms take sets of Cartesian coordinates and try to fit
a circle that passes through those points. The most studied circle fit algorithm is Least
Squares Fit (LSF) [28] of circle. This method is based on minimizing the mean square
distance from the circle to the data points. Given n points (xi , yi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the





where di is the Euclidean (geometric) distance from the point (xi , yi) to the circle. If
the circle satisfies the equation
(x− a)2 + (y − b)2 = r2 (3.2)
where (a, b) is its center and r its radius, then
di =
√
(xi − a)2 + (yi − b)2 − r (3.3)
3.2.2 Limitations of LSF
The minimization of equation 3.1 is a nonlinear problem that has no closed form
solution. There is no direct algorithm for computing the minimum of F , all known
algorithms are iterative and costly by nature [29]. Moreover, the LSF algorithm also
suffers from several limitations when applied to EPZ Circle Search Problem. The first
limitation is that the adversary is not sure which points in an activity intersect the
EPZ. There can be up to 4 endpoints in a modified route, but at most two of these
points intersect the EPZ. Feeding one of the non-intersecting points into LSF will lead
to an inaccurate result. Therefore, the adversary must run the LSF algorithm with all
possible combinations of endpoints and then pick the result that minimizes F . However,
we discovered through experimentation that the LSF algorithm is prohibitively slow for
large sets of activities. The third limitation is that LSF considers circles of all possible
radii. However, in the case of fitness tracking services context, the algorithm need only
consider the small finite set of radii RS.
In order to overcome above mentioned limitations, we devised a simpler and more
efficient algorithm that fits our needs. We will first give a strawman algorithm to search
EPZ then we will refine this algorithm in various steps.
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3.2.3 Algorithm Strawman
Given a set of activities Au and possible radii RS for a service, iterate through pairs
of activities and perform pairwise inspection of each possible combination of endpoints.
For each pair of endpoints (x1, y1), (x2, y2), solve the simultaneous equations:
(xc − x1)2 + (yc − y1)2 = r2 (3.4)
(xc − x2)2 + (yc − y2)2 = r2 (3.5)
where r is one of the radius from RS and (xc, yc) is the center of a possible EPZ.
Store each solution for the simultaneous equations as a candidate EPZs in set SS. When
finished, return a randomly selected item in SS as a guess for the protected location.
Refinement #1 (Confidence Score & Threshold): The above algorithm is not
deterministic – multiple EPZs are predicted by the algorithm, but only one is the correct
one for the given user u. Pruning these possibilities requires the introduction of a metric to
indicate that one candidate EPZ is more likely to be correct than the others. We observe
that the correct EPZ prediction will occur most often; this is because all endpoint pairs
that intersect the EPZ will produce the same result, whereas endpoint pairs that do
not intersect the EPZ will produce different results each time. Therefore, we introduce a
consensus procedure to select our prediction from the set of candidate EPZs. A confidence
score is assigned to each EPZ, where the value of this metric is the number of activity
start/end points that independently agree on the location of the EPZ. To prevent our
algorithm from issuing a bad prediction when insufficient information (i.e., activities)
is available, we also introduce a confidence threshold τc. τc represents the minimum
confidence score needed to qualify as an EPZ prediction. If a candidate EPZ is less than
the confidence threshold, then it is removed from consideration. The final prediction of
the algorithm, if any, is the candidate EPZ with the highest confidence score exceeding
tc, as shown in line 20 of Algorithm 3.1.
Refinement #2 (Distance Similarity Threshold): Due to sampling noise and im-
precision in the GPS coordinates made available by fitness tracking devices/services, it
may be that activity endpoints do not lie exactly on the EPZ circle. As a result, our
algorithm will predict slightly different pg values for different endpoints pairs, even when
considering endpoints that truly intersect the EPZ. Our algorithm will not be able to ac-
cumulate confidence in a given prediction unless we can account for this noise. Therefore,
we introduce a distance similarity threshold τd. When comparing two candidate EPZs to
one another, the refined algorithms considers two circles as same if the distance between
the centers is less than or equal to this threshold. τd is used in the Algorithm 3.1 from
line 13 to line 18.
Refinement #3 (Activity Intersection Threshold): To reduce the space of candi-
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Algorithm 3.1: EPZ Search Algorithm
Inputs : Au, τd, τc, τi, RS
Output: KeyValueStore of EPZ, confidence level
1 PossibleEPZs← KeyV alueStore()
2 foreach (A1, A2) ∈ Au do
/* 6 possible point pairs are generated. */
3 PointPairs ← Pairs of start and end points from A1 and A2
4 foreach PointPair ∈ PointPairs do
/* For each possible EPZ radius. */
5 foreach r ∈ RS do
6 SS ← Solve simultaneous eq. for r, PointPair
7 foreach EPZ ∈ SS do
8 PossibleEPZs[EPZ]← 1
9 foreach EPZ ∈ PossibleEPZs do
10 foreach (A) ∈ Au do
/* Haversine formula calc. dist. between coords. */
/* Refinement #3 */
11 if EPZ.R − Haversine(EPZ,A) > τi then
12 Delete(PossibleEPZs[EPZ2])
13 foreach EPZ1 ∈ PossibleEPZs do
14 foreach EPZ2 ∈ PossibleEPZs do
15 if EPZ1 6= EPZ2 then
/* Refinement #2 */
16 if Haversine(EPZ1,EPZ2) < τd then
17 PossibleEPZs[EPZ1]+ = PossibleEPZs[EPZ2]
18 Delete(PossibleEPZs[EPZ2])
19 foreach key, value ∈ PossibleEPZs do
/* Refinement #1 */
20 if value < τc then
21 Delete key from PossibleEPZs
22 return PossibleEPZs
date EPZs, we can leverage the knowledge that no endpoint from any activity in the set
Au should fall within the candidate EPZ’s circle, as this necessarily implies that an EPZ
was not active in that area for user u. However, we must also account for measurement
error when performing this test – due to noise in GPS sampling, there is a chance that
an activity passing nearby the area of the candidate EPZ could produce endpoints that
appear to lie within the circle. This would result in ruling out a candidate EPZ that may
in fact be the true EPZ. To mitigate this problem, we introduce an activity intersection
threshold τi. Our refined algorithm does consider an endpoint to intersect a candidate
EPZ unless it falls more than τi within the EPZ circles, as shown in the Algorithm 3.1
from line 9 to line 12.
3.2.4 Algorithm Refined
Extending our original strawman algorithm, our final refined algorithm is shown in
Algorithm 3.1. Given as input a set of activities for a single user Au, distance similarity
threshold τd, activity intersection threshold τi, confidence threshold τc, and set of EPZ
radii RS, the algorithm returns all the candidate EPZs with their confidence value, with
the highest confidence point pg representing a prediction for u’s protected location. Note
10
that value of thresholds depend on the fitness tracking service and require training runs
to parameterize. We will describe our procedure for finding these threshold values in 4.2.
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CHAPTER 4: DATA COLLECTION
To evaluate the plausibility of the above EPZ attack algorithm, we require a large
corpus of naturalistic usage data for a fitness tracking app. Strava is one of the most
popular fitness tracking apps, with over a million active monthly users [30] and over a
billion total activities recorded so far. We thus select it as an exemplar fitness tracking
app 1. In this section, we describe our methodology for collecting usage information
from public posts to the Strava network. In characterizing the resulting dataset, we also
provide useful insights as to the privacy habits of the athletes on fitness tracking apps.
4.1 METHODOLOGY
We begin by collecting a large sample of public posts to the Strava using a cURL-based
URL scraping script. Because Strava assigns sequential identifiers to activities as they are
posted, our scraper was able to traverse posts to the network in (roughly) chronological
order. It was also able to obtain data resources for each post in JSON-encoded format
using an HTTP REST API. Our scraper did not collect usage information from private
posts. It leverages the Strava interface to collect unprotected information from public
posts; it is not even necessary to be logged into Strava in order to access the sites visited
by our scraper. These features have previously been used by other members of the Strava
community in order to measure various aspects of the service [31, 32, 33].
The scraper takes as input a start and an end activity ID, then iterates across the con-
tinuous sequence of activity IDs. The crawler first visits the strava.com/activities/ID
page for each ID to extract the activity’s start date and time, Athlete ID, total distance,
total duration, reported athlete gender, and the type of the activity. It then uses the
strava.com/stream/ID API to extract GPS samples for the activity route, as well as the
total distance traveled at each GPS sample. The scraper uses the first GPS coordinate in
the route to obtain the country of the activity. Using an additional API that facilitates
interoperability between Strava and other social networks, the scraper recovers the time
the activity was posted, then subtracts the length of the activity to approximate the start
time. Through experimentation, we discovered that when an activity is associated with
an EPZ, there is a discrepancy between the advertised distance on the activity page and
the final distance traveled according to the GPS samples; the crawler check-marks the
activity as EPZ-enabled if this discrepancy is found.
1Although our approach is primarily evaluated on Strava, note that in 6.4.3 we demonstrate the attack
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Figure 4.1: Features of our Strava dataset after filtering steps.
4.2 DATA CORPUS
Using the above methodology, we collected a month worth of Strava usage data begin-
ning on May 1, 2016. The activity IDs associated with May 1 and May 31 were identified
by conducting a binary search of the activity space and verified through manual inspec-
tion. However, we note that activity IDs are assigned in roughly chronological order; we
observed activities that appeared months to years out of sequence. We attribute this
behavior to devices that had intermittent network connectivity and to users that were
deliberately set their device to the incorrect date. It is therefore likely that our dataset
does not include a small percentage of activities that occurred in May 2016. Scraped
Activities that fell outside of May 2016 were immediately discarded from the dataset.
Replicating our URL scraper across 15 CPU threads, the dataset took 14 days to collect.
Initially, the dataset contained over 23,925,305 activities. Three types of activities
from were immediately discarded: 1) Private activities for which we did not retrieve any
usage information, 2) Activities with 0.0 distance that did not have any route information,
and 3) Activities with type other than Walk, Ride, and Run . We observed 8 different
activity types (Ride, Run, Walk, Hike, Virtualride, Swim, Workout, and others) in our
dataset, with Ride, Run, and Walk comprised the 94% of total activities. Other activity
types (e.g., workouts) were excluded because they were unlikely to actual GPS routes
or protected locations, while others (e.g., Virtual-ride) likely reported false GPS routes.
The remaining dataset contained 20,892,606 activities from 2,960,541 athletes.
We observed a total of 2,360,466 public activities that were associated with an EPZ,
as opposed to a total of 1,080,484 excluded private activities. The use of EPZs is spread
out across a large number of users, with 432,022 athletes being associated with at least
one EPZ activity and 346,433 being associated with more than one EPZ activity. Total
activities by athletes identifying as male are 16,703,160 and as female are 3,227,255 while
962,191 activities have no gender information. A diurnal pattern is observable in the
distribution of activities by time of day, as shown in Figure 4.1a. 545,997 users are not
regularly active in our dataset, logging only one activity; however, as shown in Figure
4.1b, the dataset reflects a healthy variety of usage levels, with many athletes logging
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over 100 activities during the month. We also note the the diverse demographic makeup
of our dataset. Figure 4.1c shows the international popularity of Strava where United
States (US) and Great Britain (GB) featured the most activities by a significant margin,
21 other countries logged at least 150,000 activities in our dataset, with 241 countries
appearing in the dataset overall 2.
2While we took every effort to remove virtual activities from our dataset, we do not rule out the
possibility that some activities were generated by exercise equipment training routines.
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CHAPTER 5: EVALUATION
In this section, we leverage our activity dataset comprised of Strava public posts to
perform a large-scale privacy analysis of EPZ mechanism. To establish ground truth
with which to measure the accuracy of our EPZ identification algorithm, we first create
a synthetic set of EPZ-enabled activities using unprotected routes for which the true
endpoints are known. After validating our approach, we then quantify the real-world
severity of this danger by running our algorithm against legitimate EPZ-enabled activities.
We discover that the EPZ mechanism in fact leaks significant information about users’
sensitive locations to the point that they can be reliably inferred using only a handful of
observations (i.e., activities).
5.1 VALIDATION
In order to verify that our algorithm works as intended, we require a ground truth that
will enable us to issue predictions over EPZs with known centers. To do so, we make
use of the 18,532,140 unprotected activities generated by 2,528,519 athletes in our Strava
dataset. For each athlete, we search across their activities for endpoints that fall within
50 meters of one another; this distance approximates size of a suburban house plot. We
then designate the centroid of these points as a protected location, synthesize an EPZ
with a radius of 0.25 miles over the centroid, and update the GPS data by removing all
points that fall within the synthetic EPZ. Finally, our identification algorithm attempts
to independently predict the (known) center of each (synthesized) EPZ.
As discussed in 2, our algorithm is parameterized by three thresholds: td, tc, and ti.
To determine effective values for these parameters, we withheld from the above synthetic
data a set of 10,000 athletes. We determined that an appropriate value for the distance
threshold td was 0.05 meters and td was 0.1 meters. We set our confidence threshold tc
to 3, because our predictions were never conclusive using just two activities, as discussed
below. We note that these values needs to be adjusted for different services, or as Strava
modifies the sampling/precision of its GPS coordinates1. Using these parameters, we were
able to identify 96.6% athletes out of 2,518,519. As noted previously, our identification
algorithm is not deterministic; however, by selecting the highest confident candidate EPZ,
we were able to correctly predict 96.6% of EPZs in the synthesized set.
Failure Conditions. For 3.4% of athletes, we were unable to identify an EPZ. The
reason for this is almost entirely due to a lack of available observations. If only two
activities were available for a given athlete, it was common that only two points would
1Between preliminary experimentation and data collection, we observed Strava increase the granular-


































Radii of EPZs (Miles)
Figure 5.1: Summary of number of athletes identified using each possible EPZ radius. As
our technique is agnostic to the radius size, this finding suggests that the smallest privacy
















































































(c) Identification rate by Total
Duration.
Figure 5.2: CDFs for identified versus unidentified locations across various metrics.
Activities count is the greatest predictor of successful identification of protected locations,
suggesting that our technique would be more successful over a longer time frame.
intersect the EPZ. With only two intersection points, five candidate EPZ of equal likeli-
hood are discovered, one for each of the possible radii. This motivates our decision to set
tc to 3, as it removes a failure condition that would lead to a high false positive rate in
the subsequent tests. Only in rare instances were more than two intersections obtained
from just two activities.
5.2 RESULTS FOR EPZ IDENTIFICATION
Having validated the effectiveness of our technique against a synthesized dataset, we
now turn our attention to identifying actual protected locations of actual Strava athletes.
We ran our algorithm, as parameterized above, against our dataset of 2,360,466 EPZ-
enabled activities generated by 432,022 athletes. Using our technique, we were able to
identify 84% of all users protected locations with more than one EPZ-enabled activity.
Under favorable conditions in which a user records at least 3 EPZ-enabled activities, our
accuracy increases to 95.1%.
Figure 5.1 summarizes the protected locations identified by EPZ radius size. As we will
demonstrate in 5.2, the effectiveness of our algorithm degrades against large EPZ radii,
due solely to their propensity to obscure entire activities; in fact, for EPZ radii of 0.625
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miles, we see the accuracy of our approach falls to 44% against synthetic data. However,
this decrease in efficacy alone does not account for the large difference in frequency of
EPZ size. For example, if each radius were equally popular, we would have expected to
identify 80,000 athletes with the 0.625 mile radius. As a result, this figure most likely
reflects the distribution of EPZ radii popularity. We therefore infer that the smallest
EPZ is several times more popular than any other EPZ size, and that the popularity of
each EPZ is inversely correlated to its radius.
We also wished to characterize the circumstances under which our technique succeeded
and failed. Figure 5.2 shows the cumulative density functions (CDFs) of identified loca-
tions and unidentified locations across several different potentially influential metrics: the
activities count for the athlete (5.2a), the total distance traveled by the athlete (5.2b),
and the total duration of athlete activity (5.2c). Upon visual inspection, it is clear that
the greatest predictor of whether or not a protected location is leaked is the total number
of activities observed. Locations that were not identified had an average of 4.6 activi-
ties, whereas locations that were identified had an average of 6.2 activities. Recall our
dataset samples just a single month of Strava activity; this finding indicates that, over a
prolonged window, the number of leaked locations is likely to be much larger than 95.1%
amongst regular users of Strava.
Failure Condition. For 16% of the 432,022 total athletes that logged an EPZ-enabled
activity, we were unable to detect the protected location. The reason for this is, like in our
validation study, there were a number of athletes with too few activities to exceed the tc
confidence threshold. Out of the total number of athletes, we found that 11% had recorded
1 activity and out of this set, zero protected locations were identified. To demonstrate, we
filtered low-activity athlete accounts and considered only the remaining 283,920 athletes.
Our algorithm identified 96% of the protected locations for these moderately active users
(3+ EPZ-enabled activities). The remaining 4% are accounted for by athletes that logged
a single activity for multiple distinct EPZs that did not intersect. For example, one athlete
recorded an EPZ-enabled activity in two different cities. These findings indicate that




While the EPZ mechanism is widely used by fitness tracking services, it lags behind
the state-of-the-art in location privacy research. In this section, we address this gap in
the literature by testing state-of-the-art privacy mechanisms against our Strava dataset,
as well as proposing our own defense that fuzzes the boundaries of EPZs in order to
frustrate our attack.
6.1 OBFUSCATION TECHNIQUES
Location obfuscation techniques are complementary to anonymity; rather than hiding
user identities, location obfuscation techniques assume that user identities exist but add
uncertainty and randomness in collected locations to decrease accuracy. Figure 6.1 shows
the intuition of the three approaches that we consider.
1. Modify Radius Size. Ardagna et al. propose location privacy for fitness tracking
domains [17] by applying a modification to the EPZ radius to enlarge the privacy zone,
as shown in the Figure 6.1a. Here, r is the original radius of privacy zone and r ′ is
the enlarged radius. The intuition behind this technique is that, by placing last visible
point in the activity further away from the protected location, the location will be
harder to guess.
2. Fuzz EPZ Intersection Points. In all current EPZ implementations, fitness track-
ing services return a GPS coordinate for endpoints that lie precisely on the boundary
of the privacy zone. We reason that obscuring the location of the boundary will signif-
icantly increase the difficulty of an EPZ identification attack. We therefore present a
novel fuzzing method that, for each posted activity, randomly removes a small number
of GPS coordinates beyond the true boundary of the EPZ. We predict that a small
amount of noise (e.g., a few meters) injected in this fashion will dramatically change
the location of the attacker’s prediction (e.g., a few blocks).
3. Spatial Cloaking. Another technique of location obfuscation is spatial cloaking [19].
We adapt spatial cloaking the in context of fitness tracking services. We shift the
center of EPZ, concealing the protected location at an unknown point within the
privacy zone. This obfuscation is shown in Figure 6.1c, where d is the size of the shift
θ is an direction (angle) in which center moves. Note that while shifting center, the d
needs to be always less than the radius of previous privacy zone circle otherwise user
sensitive location information will not be obfuscated. We pick d using random value













Figure 6.1: Obfuscation techniques for EPZs. The original EPZ circle is shown in white,
while the enhanced EPZ circle is shown in green. In Figure 6.1b, the circle is unmodified but
each activity route truncated by a random number of coordinates.
level of privacy [18] 1.
6.2 DATA SYNTHESIS
To test the above privacy extensions, we generated obfuscated privacy zone records
using our Strava dataset using 18,532,140 unprotected (not-EPZ enabled) activities. The
reason for using unprotected activities is that they provided known locations to use
as ground truths, and also because some countermeasures may actually reveal parts of
the true route that were concealed by Strava’s EPZ implementation. We generated a
synthetic dataset using the same technique described in 5.1. For each user, we searched
their activities for route endpoints that fell within 50 meters of one another. We took the
centroid of these points and designated as a synthetic protected location. By considering
only those activities associated with one of these protected locations, our subsequent
analysis was based off 1,593,364 users and associated activities. Finally, we applied a
privacy-enhanced EPZ to each protected location as described below.
6.3 COUNTERMEASURE IMPLEMENTATIONS
Modify Radius: For each user, we apply each of the 5 EPZ radii permitted by Strava,
which enables us to see the affect of radius size on accuracy.
Fuzz EPZ Intersection Points: After removing points from each route that fall within
the EPZ, we continue to remove points up to a random distance ri past the intersection
(see Figure 6.1b) where 0 < ri < F . We initially set F to 80 meters, a value intended to
approximate the size of a city block.
Spatial Cloaking: For each user, we choose a random radius r′ from the set of permissible
EPZ radii on Strava, a random angle θ ranged from 0 to 355 by factors of 5, and a random




























Radii of EPZs (miles)
Figure 6.2: Accuracy of modify radius attack with different EPZ radii.
value d where 0 < d < r′. We then shifted the center of the EPZ by distance d in the
direction of θ. This ensured that the EPZ still covered the user’s protected location,
but that location was at a random point within the EPZ instead of the center. d was
generated using a Planar Laplacian mechanism [18] to achieve ε-geo-indistinguishability.
This function takes ε which was set to 1 and r which was set to r′. Finally, we truncated
all user activities such that no GPS coordinate fell within the enhanced EPZ.
6.4 COUNTERMEASURE EVALUATION
6.4.1 Modify Radius
Against this obfuscation, we deployed our original EPZ identification attack as de-
scribed in in Section 2. The results are shown in Figure 6.2; while our accuracy is at 99%
against 0.125 mile EPZs. our effectiveness plummets to 46% against 0.625 mile EPZs.
This finding would seem to suggest that a viable and immediately applicable counter-
measure against EPZ identification is simply to use one of the large radius options that
are already made available by Strava. Unfortunately, upon further analysis we discov-
ered that this was not the case. This drop in accuracy is not a result of the increased
distance between endpoints and the protected location, but simply the larger radii will
often completely envelope a posted activity. In other words, the loss of accuracy can be
accounted for by a decrease in observable routes (and their endpoints). At 0.625 miles,
the majority of the activities in our dataset become invisible, dealing a major blow to
the utility of the fitness tracking service.
6.4.2 Fuzz EPZ Intersection Points
Against this obfuscation, we considered that an attacker may try to account for the

































Figure 6.3: Accuracy of attack against fuzzing EPZ intersection points with the fixed F and































Figure 6.4: Accuracy of attack against fuzzing EPZ intersection points with changing F and
fixed value of constant c. Each line represent different EPZ radii.
cation algorithm. We considered a simple extension where τd incorporated the fuzzing
value F by some constant factor:
τ ′d = τd + cF (6.1)
We parameterized c by selecting a random subset of 1,000 athletes and running our
algorithm using different c values but with a fixed F of 80 meters. As shown in Figure 6.3,
the optimal value of c turned out to be 1.
Having parameterized the attacker, we next set out to tune our fuzzing parameter in
order to identify an acceptable tradeoff between privacy and usability of the fitness track-
ing service. Selecting a different random subset of 1000 users, we applied the enhanced
EPZ mechanism. For each of the 5 permissible Strava radii r, we applied different values
of F ranging from 40 to r, with a ceiling of 500 meters. Several interesting findings emerge
from our results, shown in Figure 6.4. The first is that, while a protected location can
be predicted with 96% accuracy when r = 0.250 miles, that accuracy drops to 32% with
r = 0.125 miles and F = 40 meters. This is significant because a much larger section of
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(b)
Figure 6.5: (a) Activity example that demonstrates the intuition behind our attack on the
spatial cloaking. If routes are moving in the direction of the protected location when they
cross the EPZ, they should intersect relatively close to protected location. (b) Accuracy of
intersection attack on spatial cloaking with different EPZ radii. The identification rate is not
dependent on radius size.
It is also visible that higher F values quickly offer diminishing returns on privacy. At
F = 200 meters (0.124 miles), accuracy is less than or equal to 15% against all radii.
This validates our theory that injecting a small amount of noise into EPZ intersection
points may lead to dramatic increases in privacy level. However, we note that there are
likely more expressive models for the attacker to overcome fuzzing noise, which we leave
for future.
6.4.3 Spatial Cloaking
Against this obfuscation, it no longer makes sense for an attacker to predict the center
of the enhanced EPZ, as the protected location is equally likely to fall anywhere within the
circle. However, we predict that the direction of an activity route as it enters the EPZ
still leaks significant information about the user’s protected location. To demonstrate
this, we propose a new attack that interpolates the direction of routes as they enter the
EPZ. Figure 6.5a demonstrates the intuition of this approach. For each user activity, we
inspect the last 2 GPS points at the end of the route, then extend the route through the
EPZ with simple linear interpolation. After doing this for every activity, we tabulate all
of the points in the EPZ at which these lines intersect. We then group these intersections
together to find the maximum number of intersection points that fall within td of one
another. If multiple intersection points were found that fell within td of each other,
we calculated the centroid of these points and issued a prediction. We considered our
prediction successful if the highest confidence centroid fell within 50 meters of the actual
protected location.
Our results can be found in Table 6.1. Unsettlingly, this simple interpolation attack is
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Radii Random Guess Prediction Improvement
0.125 6.178% 45.0 % 7x
0.250 1.544% 41.3 % 27x
0.375 0.686% 39.1 % 57x
0.500 0.386% 37.6 % 98x
0.625 0.247% 36.2 % 147x
Table 6.1: Success rate of our attack on spatial cloaking compared to randomly guessing.
Although the obfuscation reduces our identification rate, our attack significantly outperforms
chance levels.
36.2 % - 45.0 % accurate against geo-indistinguishability techniques. To demonstrate the
significance of this result, consider the likelihood of predicting the protected location by
issuing a random guess that falls within the EPZ, as shown in Table 6.1. For small privacy
zones, our approach offers a 7x improvement over random guess; against large privacy
zones, our approach offers a 147x improvement over random guessing. We also obtained
similar results when running our fuzzing obfuscation against the interpolation attack.
While the identification rate here is still low, it is not difficult to imagine that a more
sophisticated version of this attack that leverages more expressive interpolation techniques
and incorporates map information to reduce the search space. These results point to a
natural tension between the desire to publish route information while concealing sensitive
endpoints; significant amounts of private information is leaked through inspecting the
trajectory of the route.
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION & MITIGATION
7.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL HEAT MAP INCIDENT
The release of Strava’s Global Heatmap published aggregated public usage data for 27
million users [34]. The motivation for publishing the heatmap was to help governments
measure and improve infrastructure for bicyclists and pedestrians [35]; however, as a
result of the sparsity of background noise in certain regions, the heatmap was observed
to leak sensitive and classified information regarding the locations of military bases, covert
black sites and patrol routes, to name a few [11]. This information which could be turned
into actionable intelligence, leading to potentially life-threatening situations [12].
Following the news coverage of privacy leakage in the global heatmap, we became
curious about the privacy habits of the Strava users that exercised at these facilities. We
searched our dataset for activities from three of the locations identified in popular media:
the United Kingdom’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Australia’s
Pine Gap military facility, and Kandahar Airforce Base in Afghanistan. We found that
1 of 7 athletes in our dataset were using EPZs at GCHQ, 1 of 8 athletes used EPZs at
Pine Gap, and 1 of 13 athletes used EPZs at Kandahar, suggesting that a non-negligible
minority of athletes at these sites were aware of the privacy risks and were attempting to
safeguard their usage.
The findings presented in this study potentially exacerbate the safety risks posed by
the global heatmap revelations. Because many of the discovered facilities are highly
secure, their identification in the heatmap may not pose an immediate threat to the
safety of personnel. However, while the identities of specific athletes were not directly
leaked in the heatmap, a related vulnerability allows an attacker to upload spoofed GPS
data in order to discover the IDs of Athletes in a given area [36]. They can then search
Strava for off-site areas that the targeted athlete frequents, making EPZs the last line
of defense for protecting the target’s home. Unfortunately, we have demonstrated that
EPZs as currently implemented are inadequate, providing attackers with a roadmap to
an insecure location where they may be able to abduct and interrogate military and
intelligence personnel.
7.2 ATTACK REPLICATION
The implications of our EPZ Identification Attack extend beyond one single fitness
tracking app. To demonstrate, we replicated our attack on Map My Tracks [21] and
Garmin Connect [22].
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Map My Tracks: Users can set EPZs of radii 500, 1000, or 1500 meters. activities. Map
My Tracks also permits users to export GPS coordinates of the activities of any user in
a CSV format. Like Strava, it is possible to detect the presence of an EPZ by inspecting
the the “distance from start” value of the GPS coordinates, which does not start from 0
if a route began within an EPZ. We created an account on Map My Tracks and uploaded
4 activities starting from the same “sensitive” location. Regardless of the EPZ size used,
we successfully identified the sensitive location by running our attack, We did not need
to reparameterize our algorithm (i.e., τd, τi), indicating that our values are robust across
multiple services.
Garmin Connect: Garmin Connect is a fitness tracking services that allow users to
share activities tracked with Garmin Connect devices. Garmin Connect provides EPZs
with radii ranging from 100 to 1000 meters in 100 meter increments. Like Map My
Tracks, Garmin Connect allows users to export GPS coordinates of activities of other
users in GPX format (a light-weight XML data format). Here, discrepancies between the
route information and advertised distance once again makes it possible to infer when an
EPZ is enabled on an activity. Creating an account on Garmin Connect, we uploaded 3
activities starting from a “sensitive” location. When launching our attack against 100,
500, and 1000 meter EPZs, we reliably recovered the protected location.
7.3 ADDITIONAL MITIGATIONS
In addition to the specific privacy enhancements presented above, we also advise Strava
and its peers adopt the following general countermeasures to order to increase the diffi-
culty of abusing their services:
Randomize Resource IDs: Strava and Map My Tracks use sequential resource identi-
fiers; data resources identifiers should be randomly assigned from a large space of possible
identifiers (e.g., 264), as already done by Garmin Connect, to prevent the bulk enumera-
tion of resources.
Authenticate All Resource Requests: Strava facilitates surveillance at scale because it
does not require authentication in order to access resources. To address this concern, we
recommend placing fine-grained resources behind an authentication wall so that Strava
can monitor or suspend accounts that issue a high volume of requests.
Server-Side Rendering of Map Resources: We do not believe that it is necessary to
expose raw GPS coordinates to the client in order to provide an enriched user experience.
Instead, activity maps could be rendered at the server, or at least filtered and fuzzed
to frustrate EPZ location attempts. Map My Tracks already renders the map at the
server-side.
Conceal Existence of EPZ: Route information exposed to clients should be consistent
in the claims they make about the length of routes. The advertised distance of an activity
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should be modified to reflect the portion of the route that is hidden by the EPZ.1
1Had there been consistency of distance claims in our study, we would have been unable to obtain a
ground truth as to whether or not an EPZ was enabled on the activity. While our methodology could
still be used to detect likely EPZs in the absence of ground truth, there would also be a large number of
false positives resulting from attempting to look for EPZs where they did not exist.
26
CHAPTER 8: HEATMAP-ENHANCED PRIVACY ZONES
Our previous work demonstrated that current implementations of the EPZ mechanism
are easily compromised, along with the fact that even a ’perfect’ information theoretic
EPZ using geo-indistinguishability is not a panacea because the route leaks information
about the location of the home. We also discovered through fitness services that they are
extremely unlikely to adopt any countermeasure that further infringes on usability (i.e.,
removing more of the route).
Therefore, a secure EPZ needs to both hide the home as well as the existence of the
EPZ. As a result, rather than erasing a route at the boundary, it would actually be
preferable to falsify route data within a certain radius of the users home. If an attacker
was unable to detect the boundary between the false and genuine data, they would be
unable to make an inference about the home’s location using the route endpoints. In this
model, the privacy of a users home would depend on the ability to synthesize a route
within a given privacy zone area that a) does not leak information about the true user
home, and b) could plausibly describe the activity of any user. We can therefore reason
about the privacy of a given location in terms of its anonymity set.
In order to build the strongest possibility anonymity set for a given protected location,
we propose leveraging the fitness services global store of usage information when syn-
thesizing routes. It stands to reason that a route that exemplifies typical behavior in a
given area would leak the least information about a specific user. In other words, it may
be that Stravas much-decried Global Heatmap could actually be leveraged as a tool for
enriching user privacy.
8.1 OPENSTREETMAPS
In order to make the simulated routes look realistic, we want to model them to roughly
follow actual roads, since we wouldn’t expect an athlete to be randomly running through
buildings / across highways. We do this by utilizing map data from OpenStreetMaps.
OpenStreetMaps is a free, open-source, collaborative project to create an editable map
of the world. It contains objects called Nodes which are points in space defined by
latitude, longitude, and nodeIDs. Paths in OpenStreetMaps are called Ways and consist
of an ordered list of Nodes. Of note is the fact that if two Ways intersect (such as a road
intersection), those Ways must share a common Node at the intersection point. This





Our new EPZ mechanism should have the following properties.
• It should not be possible to identify the EPZ boundary.
• The synthesized route should look realistic at a glance.
• The length of the synthesized route should be equal to the section of the actual
route that was wiped out by the EPZ.
• The synthesized route should be randomized so that multiple similar activities don’t
end up going to the same destination.
• The synthesized route should make use of real user data in order provide the greatest
degree of anonymity.
8.2.2 Heatmap Generation
First, the heatmap is generated statically by doing the following:
• For every activity in our dataset, break down the route into a series of segments
(mapped to OpenStreetMaps segments).
• Maintain a count for every segment, and only update it once per unique athlete.
This gives us a heatmap where each road segment’s popularity is rated by how
many unique users travelled across it.
• Create an adjacency list to find out which road segments are connected to each
other.
8.2.3 Route Generation
Once we have a heatmap, we can utilize it to generate fake routes as follows.
• When removing sections of a route which intersect an EPZ, first remove the section.
• Calculate the length of the removed section so that the generated route will have
cover the same distance.
• Identify which OpenStreetMaps road segment the cut off route was located on, and
which Node the athlete was travelling towards.
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Figure 8.1: Visualization of the heatmap for the Champaign-Urbana region.
• Run a graph traversal algorithm which explores neighboring Nodes.
• Assign weights to Nodes based on how frequently they appear in the heatmap.
• Randomly traverse the graph while weighting edge selection decisions in order to
increase the overall weight of the route.
• Generate GPS points along the path given by this ordered list of Nodes, adding
jitter and noise to make them seem realistic.
Creating Realistic Routes
Ensuring that the synthesized routes were indistinguishable from actual ones was a
challenge. Once our graph traversal had identified a series of Nodes which would comprise
the new route, we had to generate GPS coordinates along these segments in order to
prevent the resulting route from being identified as fake for being too jagged and uniform.
Simple linear interpolation was insufficient due to the resulting GPS points lying in a
straight line and being too uniform to model an actual GPS trace.
In order to circumvent this we added noise to each of our coordinates by adding ran-
dom offsets to them. Although this worked well enough to fool human observers in our
estimation, we were concerned about algorithmic detection of discrepancies between the
real and synthesized sections. As a result, we decided to redraw the entire route using
our GPS coordinate generation system so that the overall route looked uniform in its
style and in the spacing between its coordinates.
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Figure 8.2: Examples of multiple generated routes for the same activity. The athlete was
travelling from X to Y when he entered the EPZ centered at C
8.3 SECURITY ANALYSIS
Our new heatmap-enhanced EPZ has several advantages over existing implementations.
Since the route doesn’t end at the EPZ boundary, it will be impossible to run the
circle identification attack to find the center of the EPZ. Additionally, because the post-
generation route has the exact same distance as advertised, discrepancies between the real
and advertised route distances can no longer be used to detect an EPZ. The generated
route can in fact go outside the EPZ as well, leading to a much larger area that an
attacker will have to consider the athlete’s protected location to be in.
Geo-indistinguishability was the strongest defense mechanism previously available, but
even it was susceptible to our linear interpolation attack due to the fact that the location
of the EPZ could be identified. However, with the heatmap-enhanced EPZ, even detecting
whether an EPZ is being used at all becomes a challenge, thus denying the attacker a
foothold from which to start attacking. Primarily using well travelled segments for the
synthesized routes also lends an additional k-anonymity aspect to our defense by limiting
the amount of uniquely identifying information that is leaked by the route.
Lastly, Redrawing the entire route using our coordinate generating algorithm increased
the effectiveness of our system by removing any chance of the boundary between the actual
and synthesized sections being detected.
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8.4 EVALUATION
We benchmarked our heatmap-enhanced EPZ system on a machine running Ubuntu
16.04 with a 20 core Intel Xeon processor and 62 GB of RAM. It took 9 hours and 42
minutes in order to create a heatmap from scratch for 1,026,471 athletes in the state of
California. This is just a one-time bootstrapping cost though.
For every new activity that needs to be processed and added into the heatmap, it
takes around 200 ms per activity. Similarly, the time required to synthesize a route for
this new activity is on the order of 500 ms. This is a trivial amount of time and can
be accomplished without any noticeable delay whatsoever whenever a user records and
uploads a new activity.
One of the main advantages of this approach was to minimize the potential impact on
user experience for these Fitness Tracking Services. In order to quantify user sentiment,
as well as test the effectiveness of our approach, we will be conducting a systematic
MTurk-based User Study in the near future.
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CHAPTER 9: RELATED WORKS
Duckham and Kulik [37] present location obfuscation techniques for protecting user
privacy by adding dummy points in measurements with the same probability as the real
user position. Ardagna et al. [17] demonstrate that how an EPZ can be used to obfuscate
users locations in order to preserve privacy, although possible weaknesses in this method
are raised in [38]. We further demonstrate an additional weakness in the EPZ technique
that fitness tracking services utilizes which allows an attacker to identify a target’s home
address despite this obfuscation.
Social Network Privacy
The social network aspect of fitness tracking services allows users to “follow” each
other, giving them access to additional data about each other. This can lead to social
engineering [39, 40] and even automated social botnet attacks as in [41, 42], where user
information such as location is automatically extracted. We show that Strava is indeed
vulnerable to such attacks and additionally, as opposed to regular social networks; users
can “follow” someone and gain access to additional information about them without
the other person’s consent. A variety of privacy vulnerabilities have been identified on
other social network platforms, ranging from server-side surveillance [43], third party
application spying [44], and profiling of personality types [45]. This study confirms that
a number of these concerns are also present in fitness tracking social networks, perhaps
to a greater degree.
Fitness Application Privacy
Williams [46] conducted a detailed study of Strava users and their behavior towards
Strava application. He concluded that the majority of participants had considered privacy
issues when using the application and had taken some measures to protect themselves,
such as setting up privacy zones or not listing their equipment. However, in this work we
show that only 9% of all the activities we studied were using privacy zones, calling this
result into question. Further, we demonstrated that the privacy measures provided by
Strava are insufficient to protect user privacy. The demographics of Strava users [47, 48]
indicate that an attacker would have an ample supply of potential targets to choose from;
as seen in [9, 10], property theft against Strava users has already been reported in the
media. Prior to this study, a viable explanation for how these attacks could occur had
not been presented in the literature.
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Location Privacy
Geo-indistinguishability has been used previously [49, 50] to provide static location
privacy by perturbing the real location with fake location. Geo-indistinguishability is
derived from differential privacy [51] and ensures that for any two location that are
geographically close it will produce a pseduo-location with similar probabilities. Andrés et
al. [18] used Planar Laplace mechanism to achieve ε geo-indistinguishability by using noise
drawn from a polar Laplacian distribution and added to real locations. However, these
techniques are not directly applicable to mobility data such as athletes routes that we
consider in this paper. Also, existing mobility-aware location obfuscation technique [52]
which uses human mobility model and replace real location traces with plausible fake
location traces. However, this technique cannot be used directly in the context of fitness
tracking apps as users still want to share major portion of route while preserving certain
portion of route (e.g. home).
Mobile Privacy
The functionality of fitness tracking social networks is predicated on the ubiquity of
modern smart phones equipped with GPS and other private information (e.g., sensor
readings). Lessons learned in the security literature regarding mobile application per-
missions could also be applied in the fitness space to improve user privacy. Enck et al.
demonstrate a method of detecting application leakage of sensor information on the An-
droid platform through taint analysis [53], and subsequently conducted a semi-automated
analysis of a corpus of 1,100 applications in search of security and privacy concerns [54].
Felt et al. conduct a survey of application privileges and discovered that one-third of
Android apps requested privileges that they did not need [55]; our work suggests that
third party applications making use of the Strava API may also possess more privilege
than is necessary, including the ability to bypass EPZs.
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CHAPTER 10: ETHICS AND DISCLOSURE
Given the potential real-world privacy implications of this study, we have taken a
variety of steps to ensure our research was conducted responsibly. We have consulted
our Institutional Review Board (IRB) to confirm that our analysis of social media posts
does not meet the definition of human subjects research (as defined in 45CFR46(d)(f) or
at 21CFR56.102(c)(e)) and thus does not require IRB approval. The rationale provided
was that analysis of public datasets such as social media posts does not constitute human
subjects research.
We note that our use of social media posts is consistent with prior research on user
privacy [4, 5, 6, 7, 8], particularly studies that have evaluated location privacy and user
discovery [56, 57, 58]. We have disclosed our findings to Strava in the form of an advanced
copy of our technical report. While omitted from this manuscript in the interest of
user safety, our report included multiple additional vulnerabilities that were uncovered
during the course of this study, one of which enabled attackers to bypass explicit privacy
protection mechanisms in order to access sensitive user data. Strava has acknowledged
these vulnerabilities, as well as the EPZ Identification Attack, and is currently working
to incorporate our suggested countermeasures into their service. Specifically, Strava’s
development team is currently implementing a geo-indistinguishability mechanism within
their EPZ feature based on our recommendations. More recently, we notified Garmin
Connect and and Map My Tracks after replicating our EPZ Identification Attack on
their services, and were informed that they took our recommendations under advisement
and made (confidential) changes to their EPZ mechanism.
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CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
11.1 CONCLUSION
As fitness tracking services have grown in popularity, the online sharing of fitness data
has created concerns for personal privacy and even national security. Understanding the
effectiveness of privacy protections in such a system is paramount. In this paper, we
have conducted a deep analysis of the privacy properties of Strava, an exemplar fitness
tracking app. While we identified significant demand for privacy protections by users
of these services, we have also demonstrated current mechanisms are inadequate; we
found that the homes of 84% of privacy-conscious athletes are immediately identifiable
by attackers, and in fact that the only safe Strava athletes are those that use the service
infrequently. However, through the insights gained in this study, we were able to develop
and empirically demonstrate the efficacy of several novel privacy mechanisms that are
currently being deployed in the Strava service. It is our hope that this work spurs greater
interest in the efficacy and usability of privacy features in fitness tracking apps.
11.2 FUTURE WORK
A user study is currently being worked on to analyze the efficacy of our attack, as
performed by humans as opposed to computers. We believe that even though defenses
such as fuzzing decrease the effectiveness of our algorithm, humans would not be so easily
fooled. Additionally, we want to test out the practical usefulness of our route-generation
algorithm and quantitatively see how effective it is in protecting sensitive locations. One
of the main steps to be taken in this direction involves determining whether users can
distinguish between real and generated routes.
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